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[1971 c.743 §106] 163.345 Age as a defense in certain cases.
(1) In any prosecution under ORS 163.355, 163.365, 163.385, 163.395, 163.415, 163.425, 163.427 or 163.435 in which the victim’s lack of consent was due solely to incapacity to consent by reason of being less than a specified age, it is a defense that the actor was less than three years older than the victim at the time of the alleged offense.
(6) “Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.
(2) A lack of verbal or physical resistance does not, by itself, constitute consent but may be considered by the trier of fact along with all other relevant evidence.
See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes for further explanation.
163.263 Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the second degree.
[1971 c.743 §104; 1975 c.461 §1; 1977 c.844 §1; 1979 c.744 §7; 1983 c.500 §1; 1999 c.949 §1; 2009 c.770 §1] Legislative Counsel has substituted “chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971,” for the words “this Act” in section 104, chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, compiled as 163.305.
Specific ORS references have not been substituted, pursuant to 173.160.
(1) A person commits the crime of trafficking in persons if the person knowingly recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide or obtain by any means, another person and: (2) A person commits the crime of trafficking in persons if the person knowingly benefits financially or receives something of value from participation in a venture that involves an act prohibited by subsection (1) of this section or ORS 163.263 or 163.264. A person who is the victim of a crime described in ORS 163.263, 163.264 or 163.266 may assert the defense of duress, as described in ORS 161.270, if the person is prosecuted for conduct that constitutes services under ORS 163.261, that the person was caused to provide. (1) A person commits the crime of coercion when the person compels or induces another person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in the other person a fear that, if the other person refrains from the conduct compelled or induced or engages in conduct contrary to the compulsion or inducement, the actor or another will: (e) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person’s business, except that such a threat is not deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; (g) Unlawfully use or abuse the person’s position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely. In any prosecution for coercion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that the victim or another person would be charged with a crime, it is a defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that the sole purpose of the defendant was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of the threatened charge.